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Abstract—IoT security and privacy has raised grave concerns.
Efforts have been made to design tools to identify and understand
vulnerabilities of IoT systems. Most of the existing protocol
security analysis techniques rely on a well understanding of the
underlying communication protocols. In this paper, we systemat-
ically present the first manual reverse engineering framework for
discovering communication protocols of embedded Linux based
IoT systems. We have successfully applied our framework to
reverse engineer a number of IoT systems. As an example, we
present a detailed use of the framework reverse-engineering the
WeMo smart plug communication protocol by extracting the
firmware from the flash, performing static and dynamic analysis
of the firmware and analyzing network traffic. The discovered
protocol exposes severe design flaws that allow attackers to
control or deny the service of victim plugs. Our manual reverse
engineering framework is generic and can be applied to both
read-only and writable Embedded Linux filesystems.
Index Terms—IoT System, Reverse Engineering, Communica-
tion Protocols, firmware
I. INTRODUCTION
Security of IoT products has received increasing scrutiny as
IoT is being pervasively deployed [1]–[5]. For example, smart
plugs and routers may be fully controlled by buffer overflow
or command injection attacks [6]–[8]. Security vulnerabilities
also exist in popular IoT platforms such as AWS IoT [3], [5].
Efforts have been made to design tools to identify and
understand vulnerabilities of IoT systems. For example, Chen
et al. [9] proposed an automatic fuzzing framework to find
the memory corruption vulnerabilities caused by the software
and firmware of IoT devices. Given a well-formed protocol,
formal and heuristic methods could be used to study security
and identify the vulnerabilities of the protocol [10]–[14]. For
example, Kim et al. [10] used formal symbolic modeling
to automatically analyze the frequently-used IoT protocols,
such as CoAP and MQTT. Only when these protocols have
been formally verified (mathematically proved) could they be
considered as secure. However, the challenge of automatic
protocol verification relies on a well understood protocol.
In this paper, we propose a framework of manually reverse
engineering communication protocols of embedded Linux
based IoT systems so that automation techniques can be ap-
plied over the discovered protocols for vulnerability discovery
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and security analysis. We focused on the embedded Linux
based IoT system given its popularity. we find most IoT
devices (more than 71%) are installed with Linux, according
to the Eclipse IoT developer survey [15]. Our framework
adopts network traffic analysis and static analysis and dynamic
analysis of the app and device firmware to understand specific
details such as fields of the communication. Our manual
reverse engineering framework works as follows: (i) Obtaining
the app and firmware of the device; (ii) Collecting network
traffic generated by the device and app with testbeds; (iii)
Defeating traffic protection by using the man-in-the-middle
(MITM) proxy, static analysis and dynamic debugging to
defeat traffic encryption and obfuscation; (iv) Discovering
the communication protocol through traffic analysis, static
analysis and dynamic analysis of the app and firmware.
We have applied our framework and reverse engineered a
number of IoT systems including smart plugs, IP cameras
and air quality monitoring sensors. As an example, this paper
presents a detailed case study of the popular WeMo smart
plug from Belkin. The plug system involves three parts: smart
plugs, smartphones, and two cloud servers. A smartphone can
communicate with a smart plug via the cloud servers. The
cloud servers distribute keys to the smartphone and smart plug,
and authenticate them based on the distributed keys. Once
the communication protocol of the smart plug is discovered,
we are able to identify a serious design flaw that allows two
attacks: (i) A malicious software smartphone bot could be used
to control victim plugs; (ii) A fake smart plug can pretend to
be a real one and kick the real one offline.
Contribution: Major contributions of this paper can be
summarized as follows: (i) We are the first to systematically
propose a framework to manually reverse engineer com-
munication protocols of IoT systems. (ii) We have applied
this framework to successfully reverse engineer a number of
IoT systems. As an example, this paper presents a complete
protocol analysis of the WeMo smart plug and identifies severe
design flaws that allow attackers to control victim plugs and
deny the service of victim plugs. We also briefly discuss how
we apply the framework to a few other IoT systems. (iii)
Our communication protocol reverse engineering framework
is generic and can be applied to both read-only and writable
Linux filesystems. We collected the firmware of 514 popular
IoT devices on the market and showed that our framework is
applicable to them.
Road map: The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we briefly introduce background knowledge. In
Section III, we present our communication protocol reverse
engineering framework. In Section IV, we present a case study
of the WeMo smart plug using the proposed framework. In
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Fig. 1. A Simplified Architecture of an IoT system
Section V, we discuss the generality and limitations of our
framework. Related work is presented in Section VI and we
conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present a brief introduction to the
architecture of an IoT system and terms used in this paper.
A. Architecture of an IoT System
Fig. 1 shows a typical IoT communication system based
on our experiments and previous researches [13], [14], [16],
[17]. The system consists of three components, an IoT device,
a controller and a cloud server. The IoT device implements
specific functionalities, such as medical monitoring and elec-
trical control. The controller, such as a smartphone app, is
used to control the IoT device. The cloud server is used to
relay messages between the controller and the IoT device.
The cloud server may provide other services including device
management, data storage and analysis. For a smart plug
system, the smart plug is the IoT device while the smartphone
app is the controller. When the controller and IoT device
are located in the same network, the smart plugs official app
could be used to directly communicate and control the plug
through WiFi. If the controller and IoT device are in different
networks, a cloud server could be adopted to transmit the
message between the controller and the IoT device so as to
traverse the NAT (Network Address Translation).
B. Communication Protocols and Terms
An IoT communication system may realize complicated
communication protocols and various functionalities. We have
identified four common phases of an IoT communication pro-
tocol, including paring, binding, authentication and controlling
[13], [18], which are crucial for the overall system security. (i)
Pairing: To bootstrap and configure an IoT device, a user often
needs to connect a controller (e.g. an app on a smartphone)
to the IoT device via various communication venues. For
example, the IoT device can work as a WiFi access point
(AP) so that the controller can connect to it. The controller
can also connect to the IoT device via Bluetooth. We denote
this connecting process as pairing. This is relevant to security
since the pairing process may be under malicious sniffing and
anyone may get access to the IoT device, particularly in the
cases that the device is deployed in public. (ii) Binding: When
pairing is completed, a binding mechanism is often employed
so that the cloud server can associate the controller and IoT
Obtaining the app and device firmware
Collecting network traffic
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Fig. 2. Workflow of communication protocol reverse engineering framework
device, and relay messages between them. (iii) Authentica-
tion: The controller, device and cloud server often need to
authenticate each other to defeat various threats and abuses.
(iv) Controlling: After authentication, the controller can take
control of the IoT device via a cloud server or a local network.
III. FRAMEWORK OF MANUALLY REVERSE ENGINEERING
IOT COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we will present the assumption about capa-
bilities of security analysts, and our manual reverse engineer-
ing framework.
A. Capabilities of Security Analyst
We adopt the term “security analyst” to refer to those
who would use our framework to reverse engineer third party
IoT products. We make the following assumptions about the
capabilities of the security analyst: (i) The analyst can obtain
IoT devices of interest and the controller applications, as well
as set up a testbed. Without loss of generality, an Android
app is used as an example of the controller. Most IoT vendors
provide both Android and iOS apps, and the communication
protocol for the Android app and iOS app is the same.
Therefore, whether the Android app or iOS app is analyzed,
the analyst can extract the complete communication protocol.
(ii) We focus on IoT devices that use the popular and open
source embedded Linux based Operation System (OS).
B. Overview
Fig. 2 illustrates the workflow of our manual reverse engi-
neering framework: obtaining the app and device firmware,
collecting network traffic, defeating traffic protection, and
discovering the communication protocol.
1) Obtaining the app and device firmware: The app is often
free and can be downloaded from Google Play (or Apple
App Store). The device firmware may be obtained from
the manufacturer’s website, over-the-air (OTA) update
process [19] (i.e., firmware update process) or reading
the flash chip as discussed later in this section. The first
two approaches are straightforward. However, they may
not be always available.
2) Collecting network traffic: In this step, we particularly
want to collect network traffic and understand security re-
lated phases of the IoT communication protocols. During
3the pairing process, the IoT device may work as a WiFi
Access Point (AP) and the controller connects to this AP.
A sniffer is needed to dump the pairing traffic. After pair-
ing, the device and controller will connect to the Internet
through a router/switch/AP. For simplicity, we will use
AP to refer to router/switch/AP. To intercept the traffic
after pairing, we set up our own APs. The controller and
IoT device connect to our APs and communicate with
each other through either the local network or Internet.
The traffic of interest can be collected from these APs.
3) Defeating traffic protection: Some vendors may adopt
TLS/SSL encryption or obfuscation to protect the com-
munication. The analyst can defeat the TLS/SSL encryp-
tion with a MITM proxy. Obfuscation algorithms can be
disclosed through static analysis and dynamic debugging
of the app and firmware.
4) Discovering the communication protocol: Through the
combination of traffic analysis, static analysis and dy-
namic analysis of the app and firmware, the communi-
cation protocol can be discovered. Based on the discov-
ered communication protocol, the analyst may use either
heuristic methods or formal methods to find vulnera-
bilities of the protocol. In this paper, we use heuristic
methods to demonstrate the feasibility of the reverse
engineering approach.
C. Obtaining the App and Device Firmware
The app is often free and can be downloaded from Google
Play. However, it can be a challenge to extract the firmware
from the flash chip, which often involves the following steps.
First, we take apart the physical device and identify the
device’s flash chip model (e.g. NOR flash, NAND flash) and
packaging type (e.g. small-outline package (SOP), quad flat
package (QFP), ball grid array (BGA)). The information can
be found on the surface of the chip or the case of the IoT
device. With such information, we can determine which type
of surface-mount packaging is applied to the device’s flash
chip accordingly. For example, if the flash uses SOP that often
exposes the flash pins, we can connect Bus Pirate [20] to
the corresponding pins via a test clip and an adapter in order
to read the firmware image from the flash. However, with a
particular packaging technology, for example, BGA, a flash
chip may not expose its pins. In such a case, we may de-
solder the flash chip by using an Surface Mount Technology
(SMT) rework station [21]. After obtaining the flash chip, a
flash engineering programmer like StarProg-F [22] may be
used to read the firmware image from the flash.
D. Collecting Network Traffic
A wireless network card supporting the monitor mode can
be used as a sniffer to dump WiFi traffic such as the pairing
traffic. To build our own AP or a wireless router, we install
Hostapd [23] on a computer with a wireless network card
supporting the AP mode. The computer is also equipped with
an Ethernet card connecting to the Internet. Some IoT devices
only support Ethernet. In such a case, we equip the computer
with a second Ethernet card connecting to such an IoT device.
Therefore, the computer can intercept passing traffic from the
IoT device or controller.
E. Defeating Traffic Protection
We now discuss how to defeat encryption and obfuscation
which are used to protect traffic from the app and IoT device.
1) Encryption: Network traffic can be encrypted by TL-
S/SSL. To decrypt the traffic, a MITM transparent proxy is
installed in front of the smartphone (i.e., controller) or IoT
device. The proxy is used to relay or manipulate the traffic
between the device and remote server, or the traffic between
the smartphone and remote server. With proper configuration,
the MITM proxy can decrypt the passing traffic. Specifically,
we use an open source tool “mitmproxy” [24] as our MITM
proxy.
We now show how to replace the target root certificate
issued by a trusted certificate authority (CA) or a self-signed
private root certificate with the forged root certificate on a
controller. Take Android as an example. From our empirical
analysis, the certificate can be located in three places: (i) The
trusted CA certificate is stored in “/system/etc/security” as an
individual file [25]. In this case, we can just add the forged
root certificate to the Android system. (ii) The private root
certificate can be packaged as a file in an app. In this case,
we use APKTool [26] to unpack the APK package and replace
the original certificate with the forged root certificate. We
then recompile and sign the APK [27]. (iii) The private root
certificate can also be hard-coded in the format of a string in
the app code. In this case, we decompile the original app into
smali code, identify and replace the original hard-coded root
certificate, and finally generate a new app.
We now discuss how to replace the original root certificate
with the forged root certificate on an IoT device. This case is
more complicated. (i) We first search the root certificate in the
filesystem of the obtained firmware. The original certificate
can be a standalone file or hard-coded in a binary file. The
certificate often has a set of features. For example, if the
certificate is encoded in Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) [28]
format, it contains a header (“- - - - -BEGIN CERTIFICATE-
- - - -”). Therefore, we can locate the certificate by searching
the header. (ii) Once we locate the root certificate, we need to
identify which type of filesystem is used by the firmware so
that a specific replacement method can be applied. An open
source tool named Binwalk [29] is introduced to identify the
filesystem type, either a writable filesystem, such as JFFS2
and UBIFS or a read-only filesystem, such as SquashFS and
CramFS. For a read-only filesystem, the replacement cannot
be made directly since modification is not allowed. We can
re-flash a customized firmware with the forged root certificate
into the device. We may need to generate the Cyclical Redun-
dancy Check (CRC) and append it to the customized firmware
to pass the chip’s integrity check. For a writable filesystem,
there are two ways to replace the original certificate: (a) If
we can get into the console of the IoT device system, for
example, by using universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter
(UART), and locate file transfer tools like a ftp client, we can
replace the original certificate directly via file transfer tools.
(b) We can replace the original certificate directly by mounting
4the writable filesystem segmented from the firmware onto a
Linux computer. We then re-package a new firmware with the
modified filesystem and flash the new firmware into the device.
There are two ways to flash a modified firmware with the
forged root certificate into an IoT device. (i) We can flash
the firmware back using Bus Pirate or a flash engineering
programmer. If the flash chip is de-soldered for reading the
firmware [21], we need to re-solder it back to the circuit
board. (ii) We can also flash the firmware back to the chip via
the firmware upgrading interface like the over-the-air (OTA)
interface.
2) Obfuscation: An IoT system may protect its traffic by
obfuscation. Traffic obfuscation is used to make communica-
tions more complicated. Unlike encryption, obfuscation does
not require a key to encrypt or decrypt the traffic [30]. Static
analysis and dynamic analysis may be adopted to counter
traffic obfuscation.
To de-obfuscate traffic from a controller, for example, an
Android app, we first need to understand how the obfuscated
traffic is generated and then write a de-obfuscation algorithm.
To this end, we first need to check if the app is packed. For a
packed app, we can unpack it [31]–[33]. Then we can extract
the smali code using Apktool. We analyze the workflow of the
traffic obfuscation algorithm by reading the extracted smali
code. We may use Smali2Java [34] to decompile the smali
code into the Java format for easy understanding. We can
also dynamically debug the smali code by using Android SDK
and Android Studio [35] as follows: (i) We add a new field
“android:debuggable=true” in the tag of Android manifest file
“application” to enable debugging. (ii) We locate the function
of the entry activity, “onCreate”, and add a line of smali code
at the beginning of this function as shown in List 1 to make
the app wait for the debug signal after being started. (iii) We
repackage the modified APK and install it in the smartphone.
(iv) Now once we start the app, we can use Android Studio
to add break points and monitor the functions of interest.
Listing 1. Add waitForDebugger function to entry activity of app
a = 0 ; / / # v i r t u a l methods
a = 0 ; / / . method p r o t e c t e d o n C r e a t e ( L a n d r o i d / os / Bundle ; ) V
a = 0 ; / / invoke−s t a t i c {} , L a n d r o i d / os / Debug;−>
wai tFo rDebugge r ( )V
However, the method above will fail when Java Native
Interface (JNI) is applied. To address this issue, we introduce
IDA pro [36], a multi-platform tool that offers both static
and dynamic analysis functionalities. (i) We first enable USB
debugging on the tested smartphone. (ii) We copy the binary
file of IDA pro, “android server”, to the smartphone and run
it via the Android Debug Bridge (adb) [37]. (iii) We map
a port on the computer to a port on the smartphone so that
they can communicate with each other. (iv) We run the app
in debug mode, and start the IDA pro client on the computer.
The smartphone then forwards the debug log to the computer
via the configured port.
We now discuss how to de-obfuscate traffic from an IoT
device. We need to identify the algorithm that obfuscates the
messages and write a de-obfuscation algorithm. The obfus-
cation algorithm is usually stored in a particular binary file.
Therefore, the first step is to identify this file in the firmware.
We compare the information from the analysis of dumped
network traffic with the IoT device’s runtime system log. If a
match is discovered, the file can then be identified. To obtain
the log, we first need to obtain the console of the IoT device
system. If we can locate the UART port on the board of IoT
device, we can connect it to the debugging computer using
a UART-to-USB bridge with a correct baud rate. Otherwise,
we can embed a backdoor such as telnet into the IoT device
firmware and update the device with the new firmware. A
telnet app is often hidden in an IoT device maybe for the
purpose of debugging by the manufacturer and can be utilized
too. We can then log in the IoT device system through the
backdoor from the debugging computer. The log can then be
shown in the console of the computer after the IoT device
starts. For example, we are often interested in the design flaws
in authentication of the controller and IoT device. Hence we
perform the authentication phase repeatedly and compare the
ports used in each process in the runtime system log with the
port of intercepted obfuscated traffic. If the ports match, we
find the target binary file. Afterwards, we extract the binary file
with Binwalk from the firmware of the IoT device as discussed
in Section III-C.
Once obtaining the binary file, in order to obtain the
obfuscation algorithm, we can analyze it as follows: (i) We can
perform static analysis to disassemble the binary file with IDA
pro. (ii) We can also dynamically analyze it on the IoT device
using binary instrumentation [38] by inserting additional code
into the executable binary file to observe or modify the behav-
ior of the binary file. Binary instrumentation allows us to trace
functions of interest, and follow the workflow of the inputs and
outputs. To use binary instrumentation, we need to modify the
firmware with the method proposed in Section III-E1. (iii) We
can also use the GDB client and GDBserver [39] to remotely
debug the binary program of the IoT device from a computer.
We first need to cross compile the GDBserver and embed the
GDBserver into the firmware of the target IoT device and run
the GDB client in our debugging computer. By configuring the
IP address and port of the GDBserver, we can use the GDB
client to dynamically debug the target binary file and identify
the traffic obfuscation algorithm.
F. Discovering the Communication Protocols
Through traffic analysis, we may understand the basics
of the communication protocols. For details like encrypt-
ed/obfuscated fields, we perform the following procedure to
understand them. (i) We may measure the entropy of the bytes
of the traffic to determine whether the command or data is
created with cryptographic operations such as encryption and
hash. High entropy beyond a threshold indicates the data is
encrypted or hashed. (ii) We may also search cryptographic
APIs within the firmware to determine if encryption is used
and also identify cryptographic functions that are used. At
the controller side, the developers may encrypt or hash the
application layer data using cryptographic APIs of Android
SDK or C/C++ libraries. We can use dynamic analysis tools
(e.g., “Xposed” [40] and “Frida” [41]) to hook the frequently-
used cryptographic APIs [42]. Once a specific cryptographic
function is called, the information of this function is recorded.
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Therefore, we know which function is used. At the device
side, we can employ static data flow analysis to identify a
cryptographic function [43]. (iii) Once we locate the target
cryptographic function, we can obtain the original command or
data and the key for the cryptographic function by dynamically
debugging the binary file and analyzing the inputs of the target
cryptographic function with the method introduced in Section
III-E. Specifically, we can use the “Xposed” and “Frida” at the
controller side and use the GDB debugging tool at the device
side, respectively.
G. Exploring Vulnerabilities
With the discovered protocols, we can use heuristic methods
or formal methods to perform security analysis of the IoT com-
munication protocol and identify potential vulnerabilities. We
find the vulnerabilities in the four phases of an IoT protocol
(pairing, binding, authentication and controlling introduced in
Section II) often incur severe damages [13], [14]. The security
analyst may focus on these four phases while performing
vulnerability assessment of IoT systems.
IV. CASE STUDY: SMART PLUGS FROM BELKIN WEMO
The manual reverse engineering framework introduced in
Section III-C is the result of our reverse engineering of a num-
ber IoT devices, including our previous research [13], [14]. In
this section, we present a case study of reverse engineering
the WeMo smart plug using the framework and the discovered
communication protocols. We will also introduce novel attacks
against the plug based on the discovered protocols.
A. Reverse Engineering WeMo Smart Plug
We present the workflow of reverse engineering the WeMo
smart plug.
HTTPS Server
Wireless 
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Wireless 
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Controller
Plug
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station
TURN Server
Fig. 10. Architecture of WeMo plug system
1) Obtaining the app and device firmware: The official app
of the smart plug is free to download while the firmware is
publicly unavailable. The flash chip of the smart plug is shown
in Fig. 3 and it is packaged with SOP. As shown in Fig. 5, we
can use Bus Pirate to read the firmware from the flash chip
with a SOP16 clip and an adapter, which are shown in Fig. 4.
2) Collecting network traffic: A testbed is deployed to
eavesdrop on the network traffic of interest. As shown in Fig.
8, during the pairing phase, the smart plug works as an AP and
we collect the pairing traffic with a sniffer. We intercept the
traffic between the smartphone, smart plug and cloud server
by introducing two APs, as shown in Fig. 9.
3) Defeating traffic protection: The primary challenge of
decrypting encrypted traffic is to replace the original certificate
of the firmware and controller app with our forged one. (i)
We first replace the certificate of the smartphone. We find
that the original certificate is stored in “/system/etc/security”.
Therefore, on the smartphone, we can download the forged
root certificate generated by the MITM proxy through a web
browser and Android will prompt us to install the certificate.
(ii) We then replace the original CA certificate in the firmware
of the smart plug. We find a UART port on the chip as shown
in Fig. 6, where the UART port has four pins, including TX,
RX, GND and VCC. We use a UART-to-USB bridge to open
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a console of the smart plug’s embedded Linux system, as
shown in Fig. 7, and find a ftp client in the system. We put
the forged root certificate on a ftp server and download it to
the plug system through the discovered ftp client, so as to
replace the original CA certificate. The forged certificate will
be preserved in the device even after the device reboots. This
shows the plug’s filesystem is writable. By using Binwalk, we
find that the firmware actually contains a read-only SquashFS
filesystem and a writable JFFS2 filesystem. The plug system
implements a virtual filesystem, “mini fo”, which merges
the read-only SquashFS filesystem and the writable JFFS2
filesystem. When a file is changed, the new file is written to
the writable JFFS2 filesystem while the read-only SquashFS
filesystem still keeps the original file. (iii) After the certificate
is successfully replaced, we can eavesdrop on connections with
“mitmproxy”.
4) Discovering the communication protocol: We now
present how to reverse engineer the smart plug’s application
layer protocol. Based on traffic analysis, we are able to
identify strings that start with “MESSAGE-INTEGRITY” or
“Authorization”, but other fields of such strings are unreadable.
We find that these fields are generated with the HMAC-
SHA1 algorithm [44] by using the methods in Section III-F.
These fields actually contain authentication materials, which
are crucial for our security analysis.
B. Communication Protocols of WeMo Smart Plug
We now present the discovered architecture of the WeMo
smart plug system, and its communication protocols.
1) Architecture of WeMo smart plug system: The WeMo
smart plug system contains three components: two cloud
servers (a TURN server and a HTTPS server), smart plugs and
smartphones. A smart plug and a smartphone can communicate
with each other via the cloud servers, as shown in Fig. 10.
Since a smart plug is often behind a WiFi router using the NAT,
the TURN [45] server is used to perform the NAT traversal
for the plug so that a user on the Internet can send a command
to the plug. The HTTPS server has three functionalities, in-
cluding binding, authentication, and controlling (i.e., command
relay and information update).
2) Pairing: In the pairing phase, the plug works as an AP
and the smartphone connects to it. The smartphone sends a
request to the plug to obtain basic information of the plug, such
as the MAC address and serial number. After receiving such
information, the smartphone sends the plug its identification
(ID) and description, a timestamp TS, and the home AP’s
WiFi credentials entered by the user. Then the plug can access
the Internet via the home AP.
Controller
HTTPS server
TURN server
Plug
Fig. 12. Authentication phase
3) Binding: The smartphone and smart plug are bound to
the HTTPS sever as shown in Fig. 11. The smart plug first
sends the binding request, including MAC address, smart-
phone’s ID and description of the plug, SSID and MAC ad-
dress of WiFi, and timestamp TS to the HTTPS server, which
can now bind (associate) the particular plug and smartphone
together on the basis of the received information. Based on
materials contained in the binding request, the HTTPS server
produces two keys: the smart plug key and the smartphone
key. The HTTPS server then sends these two keys to the
smart plug. After obtaining the two keys, the smart plug sends
the smartphone key to the smartphone via the local WiFi
network. If the smart plug and smartphone are not in the
same local network, the smartphone can obtain the smartphone
key by sending a request to the HTTPS server that knows
the particular smartphone is bound to the particular plug.
The request also contains a message authentication code, as
introduced below.
4) Authentication: Fig. 12 summarizes the authentication
phase. Within the local network, there is no authentication for
a smartphone app to control the plug. When the smartphone
and smart plug are not in the same local network, they need
to communicate through the HTTPS server. In each message
from the plug to the HTPPS server, the HTTP message header
includes an “Authorization” field, which contains authentica-
tion data. The authentication data is generated by the HMAC-
SHA1 algorithm over the plug key and other shared informa-
tion with the HTTPS server. The HTTPS server authenticates
the smartphone in a similar way. The TURN server obtains
the smart plug key from the HTTPS server and authenticates
the plug via the Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
(CHAP) [46].
5) Remote Controlling: After authentication, the smart-
phone and smart plug can communicate with the cloud servers
as illustrated in Fig. 13. The smart plug periodically synchro-
nizes its status with the HTTPS server. To remotely control
the plug, the smartphone first obtains the status of the smart
plug by sending a request to the HTTPS server. The status can
be either switch off (integer “0”) or switch on (integer “1”).
When the device is offline, the status is unavailable (integer
“3”). Then the smartphone can send control commands to
switch on/off the smart plug via the the HTTPS server. The
HTTPS server actually forwards the commands to the TURN
server, which uses the NAT traversal to send the command
through the wireless router to the plug.
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C. Attacks against WeMo Plugs
Once the IoT communication protocols are discovered, we
can now move forward with security analysis of pairing,
binding, authentication and controlling phases introduced in
Section II-B. We discovered two novel attacks against the
WeMo smart plug: sharing attack and connection hijacking
attack. With the sharing attack, an attacker can remotely
control a victim smart plug. The connection hijacking attack
allows a DOS attack against a plug. It is worth noting that all
the experiments are conducted on the plugs that we purchase.
1) Sharing attack: We first introduce the details of the
binding phase, which involves two binding requests from the
plug. The authorization value in the first binding request is
“dummy”, as the plug key is not derived yet. After receiving
the first binding request, the HTTPS server sends back a
temporary key. The authorization value in the second binding
request from the plug is generated using the temporary key.
After receiving the second binding request, the HTTPS server
sends the plug key and smartphone key to the plug.
To explore the smart plug resetting phase, we first press the
reset button on a smart plug and then bind a new smartphone to
the plug. We find now both the original and new smartphones
can remotely control the plug. That is, the original and new
smartphones now share the plug. Through traffic analysis, we
find the plug sends only one binding request, which is regarded
as rebinding request, to the HTTPS server. The rebinding
request contains a new field, “reRegister”. The authorization
value is generated using the original plug key. It can be
inferred that the original plug key is not erased after resetting.
We find that if we set the authorization value as “dummy”
in the rebinding request to pretend that the smart plug loses
its key, the HTTPS server will send the original plug key and
a new smartphone key to the plug. Once the new smartphone
obtains the new smartphone key, the smartphone can pass the
authentication of the HTTPS server and access the plug.
Once we understand the plug sharing phase, we are able
to bind a victim smart plug to a malicious smartphone. . The
details of the sharing attack are introduced as follows.
1) To deploy the attack, the attacker needs to obtain the
victim plug’s MAC address and serial number, as well as
the home AP’s SSID and MAC address. One limitation
of this attack is that the attacker has to use wardriving
or other means to get the victim plug’s MAC address
and home AP’s SSID and MAC address. In wardriving,
the attacker drives around and performs wireless sniffing.
Blocks of MAC addresses are allocated to every manufac-
turer (Belkin in our case), which can be obtained from the
Internet. Therefore, the attacker will be able to identify
Belkin smart plugs through wardriving. We also find that
a plug’s serial number is predictable based on its MAC
address. Therefore, the attacker can remotely attack the
victim plug after obtaining the needed information.
2) The attacker can now implement a fake software smart
plug that pretends to be the real one. The fake plug
sends a rebinding request with the authorization value
“dummy” and fabricated smartphone information to the
HTTPS server to get a temporary key. Once the plug
receives the key, it resends a rebinding request with the
authorization value that is generated by the temporary
key, and then obtains the original plug key and a new
smartphone key.
3) The attacker now creates a fake software smartphone,
which uses the new smartphone key and sends commands
with correct authorization value to the HTTPS server. It is
worth noting that the HTTPS server has already bound the
victim plug and the fake smartphone together. In this way,
the attacker can remotely control the target WeMo smart
plug while the victim user cannot discover the attack for
the sharing feature of the WeMo plug.
2) Connection hijacking attack: Once obtaining the plug
key through the sharing attack, a fake smart plug can pretend
to be the real device so as to hijack the connection between
the victim user and the real plug. The details of the attack
process are presented as follows.
1) The attacker first creates a fake smart plug that pretends
to be the real one and uses it to deploy the sharing attack
in Section IV-C1. In this way the attacker obtains the
victim smart plug key.
2) Since the fake smart plug has the original smart plug
key, the fake smart plug can perform the authentication
process with the plug system’s Traversal Using Relays
around NAT (TURN) server to request a relay port, which
is shared with the HTTPS server. Therefore, the HTTPS
server knows that the fake plug uses that specific TURN
server port.
3) Now a control command from a victim smartphone is
sent from the HTTPS server to the relay port of the fake
plug on the TURN server. The command is relayed to
the fake plug instead of the real one. The traffic from the
smartphone is hijacked by the attacker, who denies the
service of the victim smart plug as a matter of fact.
3) Discussion: At the time of writing this paper, Belkin
has added a security patch trying to defeat our sharing attack.
With the patch, if the public source IP address of the rebinding
request sent from a plug is changed, the HTTPS server will
not send the original plug key, but generate a new smart plug
key. Since the victim plug still keeps the old plug key, it will
not be able to pass the authentication of the HTTPS server
and TURN server, and cannot be controlled by a controller
anymore. Therefore, our sharing attack becomes a DoS attack
under the security patch. If a user wants to reuse the victim
plug, he/she has to reset the plug.
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FILE SYSTEM OF IOT DEVICES (CRAMFS, SQUASHFS AND ROMFS ARE READ-ONLY FILE SYSTEMS AND JFFS2 IS A WRITABLE FILE SYSTEM)
File System
Manufacturer Axis Asmnet D-Link TP-Link Netgaer Netis Asus Total
CramFS 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 45
JFFS2 33 1 0 0 0 0 0 34
SquashFS 0 9 35 13 34 29 57 177
CramFS&JFFS2 249 0 0 0 0 0 0 249
RomFS 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 9
Total 333 15 35 13 34 29 57 514
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the generality of our commu-
nication protocol reverse engineering framework, present our
reverse engineering of a number of real-world IoT system, and
discuss the limitations of the proposed framework.
A. Generality of our Manual Reverse Engineering Framework
The most challenging part of reverse engineering an IoT
device is firmware analysis. The firmware may be from
different vendors with high customization. Table I shows the
mainstream manufacturers and the file systems used by their
products. We collected 514 firmware from 7 vendors by crawl-
ing the Internet. By analyzing these firmware with binwalk,
we can identify the file systems used in these firmware. For
example, out of the 333 firmware published by Axis, 6 of
them use RomFS, 45 use CramFS file system, 33 use JFFS2
file system and 249 use both CramFS and JFFS2 file systems.
The file system can be a read-only (e.g., CramFS, SquashFS
or RomFS) or writable (e.g., JFFS2). To reverse engineer these
types of firmware, we often need to change the firmware, for
example, embedding a fake CA certificate for mitmproxy or
a GDBserver for debugging. We can perform such changes
with approached introduced in Section III-E. Therefore, we
will be able to reserve engineer all the devices listed in Table
I while the actual manual reverse engineering tasks may last
long given the complexity.
B. Reverse Engineering Real-world IoT Products
Fig. 14 shows all devices we have reverse engineered,
including Edimax camera [13], Edimax smart plug [14] and
PurpleAir air quality monitoring sensor [47], [48] in our
previous work. The PurpleAir air quality monitoring sensors
are actually bare metal systems based on microcontrollers
(MCUs) without an OS like Linux. Now our manual reverse
engineering framework is still valid. Particularly OpenOCD
and GDB can be used to debug the MCU firmware through
JTAG. We now briefly introduce how we used the framework
to analyze the other devices that we are the first to have reverse
engineered.
We reverse engineered the communication protocol of the
D-Link cloud camera system. The camera uses a read-only
filesystem and we are able to find the CA certificate. As
proposed in Section III-C, we replace the certificate by gen-
erating a new firmware with a forged root certificate and
flash the new firmware into the target camera through the
device management interface. Therefore, we can decrypt the
TLS/SSL encrypted traffic, and finally find that the camera is
also under the risk of spoofing attacks.
We reverse engineered the communication protocol of the
Haier IP camera and the Xiongmai IP camera and find they are
vulnerable to the spoofing attack and the Xiongmai IP camera
also under an unauthorized access attack. (i) For the Haier IP
camera, we find the app is packed to hide the executable files,
i.e., dex files. To extract the dex files from the packed app [31],
we use Xposed and Fdex2 [49], which is a module of Xposed,
to hook the loadclass function and extract the dex files. Then,
we can hook the app with Xposed and Frida, and perform
static data flow analysis and dynamic debugging to the binaries
of IoT device using GDB to discover the communication
protocol, as shown in Section III-F. (ii) For the Xiongmai IP
camera, we diassemble the camera app for static analysis and
use code instrumentation techniques such as hooking through
Frida [41] to analyze the app side communication protocol.
We also disassemble the firmware, embed gdbserver onto a
flash and use GDB to dynamically debug the binary files of
the firmware.
(a) WeMo+++
Plug
(b) DLink+
Camera
(c) Haier
Camera
(d) Xiongmai
Camera
(e) Edimax
Camera
(f) Edimax++
Plug
(g) PurpleAir
Sensor
Fig. 14. IoT devices analyzed with our framework
C. Limitations
Our communication protocol reverse engineering framework
has the following limitations. If an IoT device employs secure
boot and the firmware image verification key is in secure
storage such as e-fuse, we may not be able to change the
firmware of the device, since secure boot will detect the change
and refuse to start the device. Similarly, if flash encryption is
enabled and the related keys are in secure storage, we cannot
9change the device firmware since we cannot obtain these keys.
However, we find few IoT products use such secure boot and
flash encryption.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the existing technologies for
analyzing the security of IoT devices and Android apps.
Particularly, we divided the state of art into three categories,
i.e., static analysis, dynamic analysis, and hybrid analysis
approaches.
Static analysis: Some static analysis approaches have been
proposed to analyze the security of the IoT device firmware
[13], [50]–[54] and Android apps [55]–[60]. For example,
Costin et al. [50] preformed a large-scale static analysis of IoT
device firmware with correlation engine which could evaluate
the similarity between the target IoT device firmware and the
vulnerable ones so as to determine whether the target firmware
contains existing vulnerabilities. Nirumand et al. [58] proposed
a MDRE (Model Driven Reverse Engineering) based static
analysis method to discover the security risks in the Android
app communication. The static analysis approaches are fast
and can reach comprehensive code coverage of the firmware
or app [61], [62]. However, some IoT device firmware and
Android apps are obfuscated or encrypted which cannot be
disassembled and statically analyzed [63], [64]. In addition,
the runtime behavior such as user input could not be statically
determined and static analysis may cause false positives and
false negatives [61], [62], [65].
Dynamic analysis: Dynamic analysis approaches could
observe the runtime behavior of the target app and IoT device
firmware and could be used to verify the correctness of the
results of static analysis approaches by running the app or IoT
device firmware with test cases [61]. For Android apps, Zheng
et al. [62] proposed a dynamic analysis framework based on
ptrace (process trace) which is a system call that could be
used by one process to control another. The framework uses
ptrace to monitor selected system calls to dynamically analyze
malicious behaviors of the binary. The frameworks of dynamic
analysis methods for IoT device firmware can be divided
into two categories, i.e., software emulator based frameworks
as well as the real IoT device hardware and the emulator
based frameworks. For the first category, the IoT device
firmware is performed on a software emulator and applied the
dynamic analysis methods [66]–[68]. For example, Chen et al.
[66] presented FIRMADYNE, which is a dynamic debugging
framework based on the emulator with an instrumented kernel.
14 previously-unknown vulnerabilities were discovered by
using FIRMADYNE with automated webpages analysis and
manual analysis.
Since the IoT device hardware is fairly diverse, it is non-
trivial to emulate various IoT device hardware with software
emulators [69]. To address this problem, some frameworks
have been proposed, which relay I/O accesses between real
IoT device hardware and the emulator [69]–[71]. For instance,
Zaddach et al. [69] presented Avatar, which is a framework
that dynamically analyzes the IoT devices by combining the
emulator and the real hardware. The framework forwards
the I/O accesses from the emulator to the real IoT device.
The framework was evaluated with KLEE symbolic execution
engine and existing fuzzing tools. However, dynamic analysis
is time-consuming as it requires numerous test cases to ensure
a certain degree of credibility for vulnerability detection. In
addition, it is difficult to generate valid test cases [61], [65].
Hybrid analysis: Hybrid analysis methods, which combines
the static and dynamic analysis technologies, have been pro-
posed [16], [61], [64], [65], [72]–[75] to improve the accuracy
of vulnerability discovery. For example, Martinelli et al. [64]
proposed a framework to detect malicious apps by performing
both static and dynamic analyzing approaches. They evaluated
the framework using 2794 malicious apps with high detection
accuracy. Palavicini et al. [74] performed static analysis on IoT
firmware to avoid path explosion when dynamically analyzing
complex binaries with symbolic execution using a software
emulator. Yao et al. [16] identified a previously unknown
vulnerability which is known as privilege separation vulnera-
bility. They leveraged firmware loading information extraction,
library function recognition, and symbolic execution methods
to analyze the IoT device firmware and located 69 of 106
firmware containing privilege separation vulnerabilities.
Those existing technologies could not be used to probe
into the various vulnerabilities located in the communication
protocol of IoT systems [17], [53], [54], [76] and there is little
systematically communication protocol reverse engineering
approaches, since it is a great challenge to reverse engineer
these protocols given the diversity of protocol implementation.
For example, Papp et al. [53] and Shwartz et al. [54] proposed
the methods for reverse engineering IoT devices. They only
focus on discovering the vulnerabilities in the firmware of IoT
device instead of the security analysis of the communication
protocol between the controller and device. To tackle this
problem, we propose a framework to reverse engineering
communication protocols of Linux based IoT systems for
further protocol security analysis in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a framework to manually reverse
engineer the communication protocols of IoT devices so that
the discovered protocol can be used for further security anal-
ysis. The framework works as follows: obtaining the app and
firmware of an IoT device, collecting network traffic generated
by the device and control app, defeating traffic protection,
and discovering the communication protocol through traffic
analysis, static analysis and dynamic analysis of the app and
firmware. We present a case study of using the framework to
reverse engineer the communication protocols of the WeMo
smart plug. Once the plug’s communication protocols are
discovered, we are able to identify a crucial authentication
vulnerability that allows the plug sharing attack to control
victim plugs and connection hijacking attack for DoS. We
demonstrate our framework is generic and could be applied to
a variety of embedded Linux based IoT systems using either
read-only or writable filesystems. We also briefly discussed
how we applied the framework to a few other real-world
IoT products and systems. We are the first to systematically
propose such a manual communication protocol reverse engi-
neering framework.
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